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Entanglement could be exploited in many interesting applications, including quantum teleportation ͓1,2͔ and quantum cryptography ͓3͔. Discussion on the nonlocal nature ͑en-tanglement͒ of quantum systems was initiated by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen ͑EPR͒ ͓4͔ and later extended by Bell ͓5-7͔. Since then many authors have studied the physical meaning of the nonlocality of a single particle ͓8-15͔. Generally, quantum cryptography schemes based on entanglement ͑EPR-based schemes͒ use two or more spatially separated particles possessing correlated properties as the source of entanglement. However, recent developments in experimental techniques ͓16 -18͔ for generating and manipulating single photons have made quantum information processing utilizing single-particle entanglement feasible. Here, singleparticle entanglement refers to entanglement of a singleparticle state and the vacuum state ͓19͔.
In the present study, we have developed a quantum cryptography scheme based on single-particle entanglement. The proposed scheme utilizes linear optics to detect a superposition of the vacuum state and a single-photon state. A variant of Bell's inequality suggested by Peres ͓20͔ is used for the detection of eavesdropping. In fact, the idea of quantum cryptography using single-particle entanglement is not new. Examples of other approaches that can be considered as quantum cryptography schemes using single-particle entanglement are the phase coding scheme of Bennett ͓21͔ and Ardehali's scheme based on the delayed choice experiment ͓22͔, which uses interferometers. In these double-rail schemes, detection of a particle state is performed by a single observer at a given site. A characteristic feature of our singlerail scheme is that both of two spacelike separated parties, whom we call Alice and Bob, detect either a single particle or no particle at their respective sites. This characteristic makes our scheme more compatible with the original meaning of quantum nonlocality ͓23͔.
We begin with a description of our scheme, which is depicted in Fig. 1 . The setup consists of a single-photon source ͑S͒ and a lossless 50/50 beam splitter (BS 0 ), which generate the single-particle entanglement state, and two identical nondeterministic projective measurement devices belonging to Alice and Bob, respectively. Each projective measurement device shown in detail in Fig. 2 cult by the fact that the superposed state is not a particle number eigenstate. The experimental setup shown in Fig. 2 , which is a generalization of the setup considered in Ref. 
where R is the reflectivity of the beam splitter. Using the second-quantized notation, the general form of the input state shown in Fig. 2 
Hence, by setting Rϭ1/2 and choosing ␥ and ␦ which satisfy ␣␦ϭ␤␥, ͑5͒
one finds that the coefficient of the bЈ † term vanishes while that of the aЈ † term does not. In other words, there is a possibility that detector D a detects a single photon, while D b detects none. By noting this event, one can perform a nondeterministic projection on the superposition state ␣͉0͘ ϩ␤͉1͘. Using the parameters chosen above, the output state can be written as
where ͉i j͘ denotes the state with i particles in mode aЈ and j particles in mode bЈ. Thus, the probability of measuring ͉10͘ is 2͉␤␥͉ 2 р1/2, because ͉␥͉ϭ͉␣͉ from Eq. ͑5͒. Similarly, if the input state is ␣͉0͘Ϫ␤͉1͘, the roles of the aЈ † and bЈ † terms are interchanged and we obtain the ͉01͘ term instead of the ͉10͘ term. In this way, the observers are able to measure a projection on a superposed state ␣͉0͘Ϯ␤͉1͘ ͓ P A Ј and P B Ј in Eq. ͑7͔͒ of a single photon and the vacuum. When we measure a projection on the input state ͉1͘ ͓ P A and P B in Eq. ͑7͔͒ which is not a superposed state, ␣ϭ0 and hence ␥ ϭ0, so according to Eq. ͑6͒ we observe a two-photon event instead of the single-photon event. ͑Or, in this case we can simply remove the beam splitter in Fig. 2 and check whether the detector D a fires or not.͒ We now discuss how to detect the presence of an eavesdropper using the projective measurement devices described above in conjunction with Bell's inequality. Choosing four projection operators
one can obtain expectation values of the operators
From these expectation values, one can define a quantity
which violates the following version of Bell's inequality, formulated by Peres:
when ͉␤͉Ͼ1/ͱ2 and ␣ 0. This inequality is obtained when we assume a local hidden variable. As usual, possible interception, detection, and substitution of the photons by an eavesdropper is equivalent to introducing a local hidden variable into the system. In this case, Alice and Bob obtain not S but 
where (E A ,E B ) is the probability that Eve measures the projection on a state ͉E A ͘ at photon A ( P ͉E A ͘ ) and ͉E B ͘ at photon B ( P ͉E B ͘ ). This represents the strategy of the eavesdropper. p A (E A ,AЈ) denotes the probability of a count from Alice's detector when she tests the projection operator P A Ј after Eve has tested the projection operator P ͉E A ͘ on the photon A. It is expressed by the quantum calculation
͑12͒
For example, setting ␣ϭ1/2 and ␤ϭͱ3/2 and considering the special case in which the eavesdropper measures only photon A, we obtain from Eqs. ͑7͒ and ͑12͒
where ͉E A ͘ϵ␣Ј͉0͘ A ϩ␤Ј͉1͘ A . With the triangle inequality, this implies 1/4рS E р1, which contradicts the quantum prediction of SϭϪ1/8 obtained from Eq. ͑9͒ for the system with no eavesdropper. In this respect, one may say that our scheme represents another experimental method for examining the single-particle nonlocality.
We may now proceed to the discussion of a key distribution scheme going as follows.
͑i͒ The photon source ͑S͒ and beam splitters (BS 0 ) periodically generate the single photon entangled state.
͑ii͒ At a photon arrival time, Alice measures a projection operator randomly chosen between P A and P A Ј . Similarly, at the same time, Bob measures P B or P B Ј . This corresponds to the selection of the analyzer axis in ordinary two particle quantum cryptography schemes.
͑iii͒ After a series of measurements, Alice and Bob announce to each other which projection operator they chose. If Alice chose P A and Bob chose P B ͑probability 1/4͒, one of them will detect a photon and the other will not. Then they can share a random raw key 1 ͑say, for a photon͒ and 0 ͑for vacuum͒. With a probability of 3/4, either Alice chooses P A Ј or Bob chooses P B Ј . Since their results are not anticorrelated ͓see Eq. ͑8͔͒ in these cases, they cannot extract keys. However, these discarded data together with the anticorrelated data from the previous step can be used to detect eavesdroppers, as shown in the next step.
͑iv͒ Detection of eavesdroppers is possible by publicly comparing a subset of the results of Alice and Bob using Eqs. ͑9͒ and ͑10͒, as described above.
We now briefly discuss another scheme that adopts deterministic projective measurement devices using cavity QED. The setup of this scheme, shown in Fig. 3 , is similar to that considered by Davidovich et al., Freyberger, Moussa, , except that the single-particle entangled state ͉͘ is generated not by an atom crossing the two cavities, but by the beam splitter and the single-photon source as in Fig. 1 .
Assuming that at time tϭ0, two ground-state atoms ͉g͘ A and ͉g͘ B are injected into the cavities C A and C B , respectively, the total cavities-atom state is then ͉(0)͘ ϭ͉͉͘g͘ A ͉g͘ B . The interaction between atoms and photons in the cavity C k (kϭA,B) is described by the JaynesCummings Hamiltonian
where is a coupling constant and ϩ,k , Ϫ,k , and a k † ,a k are the raising and lowering operators for the atom and photon states, respectively. In the cavities, these atoms interact with the photons injected into the cavities. In Refs. ͓25-27͔, it was shown that by choosing the interaction time t to be tϭ/2, one can replicate the information of the entanglement of the photon states ͉͘ to that of the atoms. In other words, the state becomes
The projective measurement on ␣͉0͘ϩ␤͉1͘ can be performed as follows. Microwave fields are appropriately adjusted in the Ramsey zones (R k ) such that a superposition of the ground state and the excited state of the atom, ␣͉g͘ k ϩ␤͉e͘ k , with ͉␣͉ 2 ϩ͉␤͉ 2 ϭ1, undergoes a unitary evolution to the excited state ͉e͘ k , which registers a click in the stateselective ionization detector D k . Except for the measurement devices, the procedure followed in this scheme is the same as that with linear optics devices shown in Fig. 1 .
Our scheme has the following merits compared to ordinary quantum cryptography schemes. First, compared to the ordinary two-particle EPR-based scheme, it is easier for our scheme to generate vacuum and single-particle entangle- FIG. 3 . Schematic of the apparatus for quantum cryptography with deterministic projective measurement using cavity QED.
QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY USING SINGLE-PARTICLE . . . PHYSICAL REVIEW A 68, 012324 ͑2003͒ ments using beam splitters. Of course, our model entails the detection of a superposition of the vacuum and single-photon states, which is rather difficult to implement. However, the difficulty involved in detecting the superposed state will also be encountered by eavesdroppers. Second, compared to non-EPR based schemes such as the BB84 scheme, it is easier for the EPR-based schemes to use quantum repeaters ͓28͔ based on quantum teleportation ͓15͔ to send information to distant observers. One shortcoming of our scheme is that, due to low detection efficiency, Bob may sometimes confuse a loss of signal with the vacuum state. In this case, Alice and Bob need to distill a secret key from the series of keys using privacy amplification ͓29͔. In summary, we have proposed a quantum cryptography technique based on single-particle entanglement using linear optics devices and Bell's inequality to detect the presence of eavesdroppers. 
